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COMMENT

Private Hospital Application Review
Process:The Right to Counsel and the
Scope of Judicial Review
I.

INTRODUCTION

Hospital law is one of the fastest growing areas in our legal system
today. The growth in hospital law is attributable to the competitive
business environment hospital boards have been forced to contend
with as a result of ever-increasing medical costs. This competition
has forced hospitals, among other things, to emphasize the quality
of their medical staffs in an effort to attract patients. Therefore, it
is not surprising that a corollary to the hospitals' efforts to attract
top quality medical staffs is the disputes which have arisen between
hospitals and potential or existing staff members.
While a physician may be licensed to practice medicine in Illinois,
he does not have an absolute right to staff membership or practice
privileges in a private hospital.' When a physician desiring staff
membership or seeking reappointment applies for such a position with
the individual hospital, the hospital will process his application through
2
its procedures for appointment and reappointment, usually set out
3
in the hospital's bylaws. It is during this evaluation and appointment process that legal problems and questions arise.
1. Settler v. Hopedale Found., 80 Ill. App. 3d 1075, 1076, 400 N.E.2d 577,
578-79 (1980); Fahey v. Holy Family Hosp., 32 Ill. App. 3d 537, 545, 336 N.E.2d
309, 315 (1975).
2. The ability of hospitals to adopt their own procedures for appointment

and reappointment was recognized in Fahey, where the court stated "lilt is generally
said that all classes of hospitals have at least one power in common. All of them

can prescribe reasonable rules for the conduct of their affairs; and all may adopt
rules that standardize the administration of their particular institution." Fahey, 32
Ill. App. 3d at 544, 336 N.E.2d at 314.
3. For instance, see BYLAWS & RULES AND REGULATIONS OF THE MEDICAL STAFF
OF ST. ANTHONY HosPrrAL MEDICAL CENTER (Rockford, Ill.), April 9, 1984 [hereinafter

cited as ST. ANTHONY BYLAWS]. The procedures for appointment and reappointment
are set out in articles VI and IX of the bylaws. The basic application process is
highlighted by the provision outlined in Appendix A.
A standard hospital appointment and reappointment procedure was recently
summarized in Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 125 I11.App. 3d 244, 465 N.E.2d
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Hospitals have been generally classified by courts as either public,'
private,' or quasi public.' Although Illinois law requires all three types
to be licensed, 7 the distinction defines the starting point from which
courts will examine issues arising from the implementation of certain
hospital policies and procedures. As a general rule, public hospitals
are instrumentalities of the state and are subject to the control of
governmental agencies, while private hospitals manage their own
affairs8 as private corporations. The legal implications of these differences are that "the arbitrary action of a governing board of a public
hospital is subject to injunctive process while the arbitrary action of
the governing body of a purely private hospital is not."' However,
554 (1984). In Knapp, the court noted that the bylaws of the Palos Community
Hospital (a private hospital located in Palos Heights, Illinois) required an initial review
of all relevant information concerning the physician by the privilege evaluation committee of each department. The chairman was then required to submit the privilege
evaluation committee recommendations to the medical executive committee. The
medical executive committee was then required to review those recommendations and
forward its findings, if favorable, to the hospital board of directors. If the findings
of the medical executive committee were adverse, to the physician, the physician was
entitled to notice and a hearing before the hearing committee. If the hearing committee's decision was adverse to the physician, he could request an appellate review.
After the appellate review, the hospital board of directors was then required to take
final action on the matter and send notice thereof to the physician. Id. at 249-50,
465 N.E.2d at 558-59.
4. '[A] public hospital is an instrumentality of the state, founded and owned
in the public interest, supported by public funds, and governed by those deriving
their authority from the state."' Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475,
497 P.2d 564, 569, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972) (quoting Woodard v. Porter
Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 422, 217 A.2d 37, 39 (1966)). See also Shulman v.
Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 61 (D.D.C. 1963).
5. "'A private hospital is founded and maintained by private persons or a
corporation, a state or municipality having no voice in the management or control
of its property or the formation of rules for its government."' Silver, 497 P.2d at
569 (quoting Woodard v. Porter Hosp., Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 422, 217 A.2d 37, 39
(1966)). See also Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 61.
6. A quasi public hospital is an otherwise private hospital that "was constructed with public funds, is presently receiving public benefits or has been sufficiently incorporated into a governmental plan for providing hospital facilities to the
public." Silver, 53 Hawaii at -, 497 P.2d at 569.
Under Illinois law, however, "the mere receipt of Federal and State funds,
the enjoyment of tax exemptions, and the presence of State licensing requirements
do not transform private hospitals' staff appointment decisions into State action . .. ."
Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67 Ill. App. 3d 420, 423, 385 N.E.2d 108,
111 (1978).
7. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 §§ 142-157 (1983).
8. Silver, 53 Hawaii at __ , 497 P.2d at 569.
9. Rutledge v. St. Vincent Memorial Hosp., 67 II. App. 2d 156, 162-63, 214
N.E.2d 131, 135 (1966) (dissenting opinion).
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where a private organization is tinged with a public interest and
regulated by the state in its day to day activities, its actions will be
considered state action for purposes of the fourteenth amendment,'"
and that organization will be subject to minimal due process
requirements." In contrast to public hospitals, which are subject to
2
the full scope of due process,' private hospitals in Illinois are subject only to the minimal requisites of due process."
Subsumed within the due process query is what scope of judicial
review is to be afforded where a private hospital does not follow its

bylaws in rejecting a physician's staff application. The problems aris-

ing on this issue result from the Illinois courts' lack of clarity in addressing the exact scope of review required by the minimal due process requirements imposed on private hospitals. Illinois courts have
followed the majority of jurisdictions"' in holding that the minimal
due process requirements applicable to private hospitals do not open
5
their staff appointment decisions to judicial scrutiny.' However, an
exception to this rule has been carved out where the hospital does
not follow its bylaws in denying the physician's application. In that
instance, the private hospital will be subject to "limited judicial
review,"' 6 which has yet to be defined with precision by any Illinois

court.

A second issue confronting Illinois courts is whether a physician
has a right to legal representation during the preliminary, informal
stages of the private hospital evaluation and appointment process.
1972).
10. Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp., 340 F. Supp. 125, 132-33 (N.D. I11.
(1940).
303
11. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296,
12. See Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 61-62; Silver, 53 Hawaii at __, 497 P.2d
at 569-70.
App. 3d 90, 95, 394 N.E.2d
13. Ladenheim v. Union County Hosp. Dist., 76 I11.
App. 3d 420, 423,
770, 774 (1979); Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67 I11.
(1978).
385 N.E.2d 108, 111
14. See Shulman, 222 F. Supp. at 59. The court stated that the overwhelming
authority, almost to the point of unanimity, is to the effect that a private hospital
has the power to appoint and remove members of its medical staff at will, and that
such action is not subject to judicial review. The court added that the only exception
to this rule is where there is a failure to conform to the procedural requirements
set forth in the hospital's bylaws. See infra note 45.
15. It is well established in Illinois that a private hospital's refusal to appoint
a physician to its medical staff is not subject to judicial review. See, e.g., Maimon
App. 3d 1090, 1093, 458 N.E.2d 1317, 1319
v. Sisters of The Third Order, 120 I11.
(1983); Settler, 80 111. App. 3d at 1076, 400 N.E.2d at 578-79; Fahey v. Holy Family
App. 3d 537, 545, 336 N.E.2d 309, 315 (1975); Mauer v. Highland
Hosp., 32 I11.
Park Hosp. Found., 90 I1l. App. 2d 409, 411, 232 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1967).
App. 3d at 425, 385 N.E.2d at 112. See also Knapp v. Palos
16. Jain, 67 I11.
Community Hosp., 125 Ill. App. 3d 244, 256, 465 N.E.2d 554, 563 (1984); Maimon,
App. 3d at 1094, 458 N.E.2d at 1319.
120 I11.

NORTHERN ILLINOIS UNIVERSITY LA W REVIEW

The problems with respect to this issue also result from differing
opinions as to the minimal requirements of procedural due process
in a private hospital's application review process. One view is that
any person who is before a tribunal must be afforded the full scope
of due process.' 7 Under this view, a physician would have a right
to be represented by counsel at each stage of the review process. 8
The opposing view is that a physician need not be afforded the full
compliment of rights at an informal hearing, and therefore would
not be denied minimal due process rights if the hospital did not permit legal representation. 9
This comment will address two issues concerning the private
hospital staff appointment and reappointment process. First, to what
extent can the judiciary review an initial staff appointment or reappointment decision of a private hospital. The implications of an
expansive judicial review role by Illinois courts will also be examined. Second, the impact of permitting physicians legal representation
at all levels of the staff application review process will be considered.
Since Illinois Attorney General Neil Hartigan has authored an opinion
concerning this latter issue, 20 the opinion will be analyzed and discussed. With respect to both issues, this comment will address issues raised by the actions of private hospitals only and not public or quasi
public Illinois hospitals.
II.

SCOPE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW

One unsettled aspect of the hospital application review process
is the extent of judicial review that is to be afforded to a physician
where a private hospital does not follow its bylaws in rejecting his
application. The scope of judicial review in this area is generally determined by the legal status of the hospital.
17. Procedural due process is afforded only when it is needed to protect those
rights contained in the fourteenth amendment's protection of liberty and property.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 569 (1972). Although courts have held
that a physician has a property interest in his staff privileges, the burden of establishing
an infringement of such property interest has generally been placed upon the physician. In addition, the physician must also show that he reasonably would have been

expected to continue as a member of the hospital staff for an indefinite period of
time, absent sufficient cause for denial. Suckle v. Madison Gen. Hosp., 499 F.2d
1364, 1366 (7th Cir. 1974). The denial of staff privileges alone is insufficient to implicate due process. The complaining physician must show a greater property interest. Cf. Roth, 408 U.S. at 569.
18. See infra notes 44 & 88.
19. See infra note 45.
20. Public Health: Due Process Rights of Podiatrists who Apply For Hosptial
Medical Staff Membership, Op. Att'y Gen. No. 84-004 (April 4, 1984) [hereinafter
cited as Public Health].
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In order for the actions of an individual or private entity to be

subject to the due process requirements of the United States Constitution, that individual or entity must have been acting under "col-

or of state law," in accordance with the interpretation of that phrase
under the Civil Rights Act. 2 The mere receipt of federal and state
funding or the enjoyment of certain tax benefits will not transform
the staff appointment decisions of a private hospital into state action
22
for purposes of invoking the fourteenth amendment. However, courts
have concluded that when a private organization is licensed by the
state, subject to exhaustive regulation in its daily operations and tinged

with a public stature or purpose, the actions of that private organization will constitute state action for the purpose of invoking the four-

teenth amendment.23 Therefore, private hospitals are charged with exercising their discretionary powers reasonably and for the public good
2
in accordance with the minimal requisites of due process. "
Where the entity involved in the dispute is a private hospital,

Illinois courts have held that limited judicial review does not violate
the requisites of minimal due process. Therefore, a private hospital
has the right to refuse to appoint a physician to its medical staff
2
and this refusal generally is not subject to judicial review. " "The

only qualification to the rule of nonreview that has developed in Il-

linois is that where a physician's existing staff privileges are revoked
or reduced, a private hospital must follow its own bylaws in doing
'2 6
so or be subject to limited judicial review." Although several Illinois courts have reiterated this exception to the rule of nonreview,

2
no court has directly addressed the scope of limited judicial review. "
21. Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940); Holmes v. Silver Cross Hosp.,
1972).
340 F. Supp. 125, 132 (N.D. I11.
22. Holmes, 340 F. Supp. at 132; Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67
App. 3d 420, 423, 385 N.E.2d 108, 111 (1978).
I11.
23. Holmes, 340 F. Supp. at 132; Van Daele v. Vinci, 51 Ill. 2d 389, 394,
App. 3d at 423, 385 N.E.2d at 111.
282 N.E.2d 728, 732 (1972); Jain, 67 I11.
App. 3d 90, 95, 394 N.E.2d
24. Ladenheim v. Union County Hosp. Dist., 76 I11.
at 111.
N.E.2d
385
423,
at
3d
770, 774 (1979); Jain, 67 111.App.
Due process, however, involves different standards of fairness for different types
of proceedings. The types of rights required by the Constitution differ in each proceeding, depending upon a complexity of factors. "The nature of the alleged right
involved, the nature of the proceeding, and the possible burden on that proceeding,
are all considerations which must be taken into account." Hannah v. Larche, 363
U.S. 420, 442 (1960).
App. 2d 409, 412, 232
25. Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 90 I11.
N.E.2d 776, 778 (1967). See supra note 15.
26. Jain, 67 I1l. App. 3d at 425, 385 N.E.2d at 112 (emphasis added). See
App. 3d 244, 256, 465 N.E.2d 554,
also Knapp v. Palos Community Hosp., 125 I11.
563 (1984); Maimon, 120 Ill. App. 3d at 1094, 458 N.E.2d at 1319.
27. See, e.g., Maimon v. Sisters of the Third Order, 120 Ill. App. 3d 1090,
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In order to determine the specific scope of limited judicial review,
the holdings of past Illinois decisions as well as those of other jurisdictions concerning this area must be evaluated and compared.
A.

ILLINOIS DECISIONS

One of the first Illinois cases to address the scope of judicial
review over an administrative hearing was Ryan v. Cudahy.2 8 The

association conducting the hearing in that case was the Chicago Board
of Trade, 29 and the court held that it was within its power to deter-

mine whether a tribunal, such as the Chicago Board of Trade, had
proceeded according to its bylaws. Furthermore, the court held that
any substantial failure to correct abuses from procedures not in accordance with the bylaws would allow the court to hold the complainant not bound by the tribunal's judgment.3" One year later, in Peo-

ple ex rel. Keefe v. Womens Catholic Order of Foresters,3 ,the court

stated as a general rule that the judiciary should not interfere with
the disciplinary powers of voluntary associations "unless the exercise
of the power has been without jurisdiction, or marked by gross injustice and unfairness." 32 This philosophy was adopted by many Il-

linois courts when later confronted with this issue.3

458 N.E.2d 1317 (1983); Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67 Ill. App. 3d 420,
385 N.E.2d 108 (1978).
28. 157 I11.
108, 41 N.E. 760 (1895).
29. This case dealt with the failure of the parties to adjust their respective
claims to money deposited as margins upon an executory sale, and the board of
trade acted as a tribunal for the purpose of deciding the dispute. Ryan v. Cudhay,
157 I11. at 113-14, 41 N.E. at 760-61.
30. Id. at 119, 41 N.E. at 763.
31. 162 I11.
78, 44 N.E. 401 (1896).
32. People ex rel. Keefe v.Women's Catholic Order of Foresters, 162 Ill. 78,
86, 44 N.E. 401, 404 (1896).
33. A prime example was the case of Werner v. International Ass'n of
Machinists, 11 11. App. 2d 258, 137 N.E.2d 100 (1956). Although this case did not
deal with the review of a hospital board decision, the court did consider the scope
of its review over the decisions of voluntary associations as a whole. The court first
stated that the general rule in Illinois was that a court should not interfere to control
the enforcement of the bylaws of a voluntary association or reverse the expulsion
of a member where it appears that the decision was made in accordance with the
association's bylaws. The court then set out two exceptions to the rule of nonreview
under which it could extend its scope and review the decision of a voluntary association. The first was when it appeared that the rules of the association governing the
expulsion had not been observed, and the second was when the accused member
had not been afforded those "rudimentary rights" which would give him an opportunity to defend himself. Id. at 279, 137 N.E.2d at 112. In emphasizing the second
exception, the court pointed out that medical associations, as well as other voluntary
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The first significant private hospital case in Illinois to address
this issue was Mauer v. Highland Park Hospital Foundation.34 This
case was significant in that it established the rule in Illinois that a
private hospital has the right to refuse to appoint a physician or
surgeon to its medical staff and this refusal is not subject to judicial
review." However, this decision failed to address the scope of limited
judicial review. The decisions of other Illinois cases addressing the
scope of judicial review outside of the hospital context, however, are
more specific. 6
associations, may expel their members and deny them membership for infringement
of rules and disregard of regulations. Furthermore, the right to exclude or expel
will generally be upheld, as the bylaws of the organization are a contract and an
agreement with each individual member. Such decisions by the executive board will
not be set aside lightly when they are clearly made in conformity with the accepted
procedures of the hospital as set out in the bylaws. So long as the bylaws are
reasonable and not contrary to publicpolicy, and the procedure may be simply adapted
to the determination of complaints, they are entitled by law to be respected and
upheld. Id. at. 278, 137 N.E.2d at 111 (emphasis added). The Werner court became
the first Illinois court to infer that the purpose of a judicial review of the expulsion
decision of a voluntary organization might be limited to determining whether the
accused member was afforded his rudimentary rights.
In Virgin v. American College, 42 Ill. App. 2d 352, 192 N.E.2d 414 (1963),
the court was again faced with the question of its authority to review the membership decision of a voluntary association. As in Werner, the violation of the accused
member's basic rights brought the case within the scope of the court's review. The
court found that there were certain bylaw violations which resulted in the accused
member being deprived of his rudimentary rights, and therefore held the expulsion
invalid and set it aside. In its opinion, the Virgin court again set out the exceptions
to the rule of nonreview, focusing primarily on the denial of fundamental rights.
Although the court stated that it could intervene if the association did not observe
its bylaws, or did not act within the scope of its power, these exceptions both appear
to concern the concept of rudimentary rights. In setting out what basic rights were
to be afforded to the accused, the court included the opportunity to defend against
any charges made, including reasonable notice thereof, an opportunity to be present
at a hearing, to confront and cross-examine those making accusations, to make a
defense, and to endeavor to refute any evidence adduced in support of the charges.
Id. at 370, 192 N.E.2d at 423. It would appear that any bylaw violation or act not
in accordance with the bylaws would fall within the elements listed in the court's
definition of rudimentary rights, making a violation of either of those exceptions
a violation of the accused's rudimentary rights.
34. 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776 (1967).
35. Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp. Found., 90 I11. App. 2d 409, 412, 232
N.E.2d 776, 778 (1967).
36. See, e.g., Van Daele v. Vinci, 51 111. 2d 389, 282 N.E.2d 728, cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1007 (1972). Although it was argued that this Illinois Supreme Court case
changed the law in Illinois on this point, subsequent Illinois cases pointed out that
this was simply a "narrow exception to ... the general rule of non-review." Maimon,
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In 1978 when the rule37 in Jain v. Northwest Community
Hospital3"8-that hospitals had to follow their own bylaws or be subject to limited judicial review-was enunciated, many Illinois courts

had already considered this issue as it pertained to other types of

associations. The holdings and discussions of these cases indicate that
the focus of judicial inquiry, when reviewing the bylaws and deci-

sions of an association board, centered upon whether the accused

member was afforded basic rudimentary or fundamental rights in a
hearing.3 9 When the court in Jain used the phrase "limited judicial
review" without devoting any discussion to the actual scope of that
phrase, the court conceivably intended to limit judicial review of a
bylaw violation to whether the violation was significant enough to
deprive the accused member of his rudimentary rights. Subsequent
Illinois decisions lend support to this construction of limited judicial
review. '
App. 3d at 1093, 458 N.E.2d at 1319. In Van Daele, the voluntary organiza120 I11.
tion being reviewed was not a hospital board, but the Certified Grocers of Illinois.
The majority opinion seemed to stray away from the settled law in this area, and
reviewed the "grocer's tribunal" decision despite the absence of any bylaw violation
by the Certified Grocers in reaching its decision. The court held that the plaintiff's
expulsion violated due process because, though it was in accord with the bylaws,
it was made by a biased tribunal. Van Daele, 51 111. 2d at 393, 282 N.E.2d at 731.
However, later courts limited the rule in Van Daele to situations where there is a
potential bias or impartiality of the members of the board, and held that it did not
App. 3d at 1094, 458
abrogate the rule of nonreview in Illinois. Maimon, 120 I11.
App. 3d at 427, 385 N.E.2d at 114.
N.E.2d at 1320; Jain, 67 I11.
Chief Justice Underwood's dissenting opinion was much more in line with the
law developed by previous Illinois decisions. Justice Underwood stated that courts
in the past have clearly adhered to a policy of nonintervention, and the basis for
reversal of an association decision is limited to a violation of the association's bylaws
or the concept of fundamental fairness. As long as the regulations do not violate
concepts of basic procedural justice, courts should not interfere. Van Daele, 51 Ill.
2d at 397-99, 282 N.E.2d at 733-34 (Underwood, C.J., dissenting).
37. See supra note 26 and accompanying text.
38. 67 Ill. App. 3d 420, 385 N.E.2d 108 (1978). The plaintiff in this case,
Dr. Jain, was on the medical staffs of various Chicago area hospitals. He applied
for membership on the defendant's Northwest Community Hospital medical staff,
but was denied membership by the hospital application review committee. Dr. Jain
alleged several due process violations in the hospital's refusal to admit him to its
medical staff, all of which the court dismissed.
39. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
App. 3d 90, 394 N.E.2d
40. In Ladenheim v. Union County Hosp. Dist., 76 I11.
770 (1979), the plaintiff physician complained that the hospital board violated its
bylaws in denying his reappointment to staff membership. After reviewing the physician's various charges, the court concluded that "the combination of the bylaws and
the charges were sufficiently clear and definite to allow plaintiff to understand what

[1985:2411

PRIVATE HOSPITAL REVIEW

In the case of Maimon v. Sisters of the Third Order,' the court
took an adamant stand with regard to the scope of limited judicial

review in a hospital case. The plaintiff in that case, Dr. Maimon,

was expelled from the hospital staff and subsequently brought his
case before the court, claiming numerous bylaw violations by the
hospital in expelling him. 2 Before even discussing its findings, the
court generally stated that "a court should not act to annul expulsions from hospitals unless unfairness is demonstrated by the fact that
the procedures followed violated the constitution or bylaws of the

hospital." '4 3 Although the court did not elaborate on the above quota-

tion, the excerpt itself indicates that when there is a bylaw violation,
a court should only decide whether that violation caused any unfairness
to the physician. This statement may indicate that, where a hospital
does not follow its own bylaws in revoking or reducing a physician's
staff privileges, courts are "limited" to determining whether the physician was afforded his fundamental, rudimentary rights. If, despite
the bylaw violation, the physician was afforded his rudimentary rights,
the expulsion should not be annulled.
B.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

Throughout the myriad of state and federal courts within our

legal system, there are varying opinions with respect to the issue of
judicial review of a hospital's actions. Basically, these views can be
separated into two groups. A minority viewpoint," which holds private
conduct was at issue and to defend himself." Id. at 97, 394 N.E.2d at 775. The
court also recognized that due to the extreme difficulty in articulating precise standards
in the area of personal fitness for medical staff privileges, the governing board of
a hospital must be given great latitude in prescribing the necessary qualifications
for potential applicants. The court concluded that the plaintiff-physician's rudimentary rights were not denied and refused to interfere with the decision of the hospital
board. Similarly, in Kendler v. Rutledge, 78 Ill. App. 3d 312, 396 N.E.2d 1309 (1979),
the court stated that considerable discretion should be given to a private association
in the conduct of its internal affairs. When reviewing an intra-association hearing,
"[t]he court's role has been limited to ascertaining whether coercive power was exercised in conformity with the association's internal law and member's fundamental
fair hearing rights." Id. at 316, 396 N.E.2d at 1312 (emphasis added).
41. 120 I11.App. 3d 1090, 458 N.E.2d 1317 (1983).
42. Maimon v. Sisters of the Third Order, 20 I11.App. 3d 1090, 1095, 458
N.E.2d 1317, 1320 (1983).
43. Id. at 1094, 458 N.E.2d at 1319 (emphasis added).
44. The minority viewpoint is based on the theory that even private hospitals
provide services which are vital to the public and as such hold a fiduciary duty to
make staffing decisions for the public good. Courts adopting this viewpoint have
found a public interest or nexus with state action in many cases in order to support
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hospitals out as serving a fiduciary duty to the public and subject

to judicial review, and a majority viewpoint,

5

to which Illinois

subscribes, which holds that the staffing decisions of private hospitals
are not subject to judicial review.
One of the principal cases supporting the minority view is Bricker
v. Sceva Speare Memorial Hospital."6 In that case, the plaintiff, Dr.

Bricker, had been a member of the hospital staff for over nine years.

However, in 1970 after he was unable to make the annual staff meeting
due to health problems, other staff members voted not to renew his
membership and Dr. Bricker was subsequently dropped from the
hospital staff. The doctor then filed suit to determine, among other
things, the extent of judicial review of the hospital's decision. In
considering this question, the court noted the distinctions between

private and public hospitals4 8 and the general rule that the decision
of a private hospital board in refusing to grant a licensed doctor staff
privileges is not subject to judicial review.49 However, the court iden-

tified a substantial interest by the public in the operation of private
hospitals. In accord with that public interest, the court stated some

measure of judicial review was necessary. A public interest "has led

to a rule that exclusion from staff privileges must be done in accordance with the bylaws of the hospital and will be reviewed by the
courts and set aside if arbitrary, capricious or unreasonable." 5
The basis for this departure from the traditional rule was first
voiced in Greisman v. Newcomb Hospital5 ' and has been followed
judicial intervention. See Note, Michigan Court Joins Majority in Denying Judicial
Review of Staffing Decisions of Private Hospitals, 6 Am. J.TRIAL ADVOC. 339 (1982)
(articulation of minority and majority viewpoint) [hereinafter cited as Michigan Court].
See also Note, The Physician's Right to Hospital Staff Membership: The PublicPrivate Dichotomy, 1966 WASH. L.Q. 485 (1966).
45. The number of jurisdictions following the rule of nonreview outnumber
those following the rule that hospitals are subject to judicial review. Some of the
jurisdictions following the rule of nonreview include Alabama, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia,
Washington, West Virginia and Wisconsin. States following the minority view include Arizona, California, New Hampshire, New Jersey and Vermont. For specific
cases from each state, see Michigan Court, supra note 44, at 340-41.
46. 111 N.H. 276, 281 A.2d 589, cert. denied, 404 U.S. 995 (1971).
47. Bricker, Ill N.H. 276, 281 A.2d at 591.
48. Id. at 279, 281 A.2d at 592.
49. Id.
50. Id.

51. 40 N.J. 389, 192 A.2d 817 (1963). Therein the court concluded that a private
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in many subsequent decisions.

Memorial Hospital,53

2

In one such decision, Silver v. Castle

the court departed from the traditional rule after
a lengthy comparison of the two viewpoints. The court first stated

that a physician has no vested right to membership on a private

hospital medical staff, but merely a privilege which may be granted
or denied by the hospital application review committee. As such, the
hospital board should have broad discretionary powers to determine
which doctors shall be members of its medical staff.54 While taking
these considerations into account, the court refused to decide that

the decision of a private hospital board should be absolute and not
subject to judicial review. The Silver court advocated that a better

rule would be to make judicial review available in cases to determine

whether due process was afforded and whether there was an abuse
of discretion by the hospital board.5 5
Despite these decisions, there are several jurisdictions following
the same nonreview rule as Illinois and limit the scope of judicial
review to determining whether the bylaw violation deprived the physician of his fundamental rights. Within this majority viewpoint, jurisdic-

tions make an exception to the rule of nonreview when the hospital
fails to follow its own bylaws in revoking or reducing a physician's
status.5 6 Generally, these jurisdictions provide for some type of judicial

review, but its limitations vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction."

In the Pennsylvania case of Miller v. Indiana Hospital,5" the complaining physician contended that the hospital violated its bylaws during
hospital, which held a virtual health care monopoly in the area, was in no position
to shield its decisions from judicial review because the hospital served a vital public
need, received public funding and favorable tax benefits.
52. See Willis v. Santa Ana Community Hosp. Ass'n, 58 Cal. 2d 806, 810,
376 P.2d 568, 570, 26 Cal. Rptr. 640, 642 (1962); Davidson v. Youngstown Hosp.
Ass'n, 19 Ohio App. 2d 246, 251, 250 N.E.2d 892, 896 (1969); Woodard v. Porter
Hosp. Inc., 125 Vt. 419, 423, 217 A.2d 37, 40 (1966).
53. 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972).
54. Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d at 567.
55. Id. at __
497 P.2d at 568.
56. See, e.g., Jain v. Northwest Community Hosp., 67 I11.App. 3d 420, 425,
385 N.E.2d 108, 112 (1978).
57. See Sosa v. Board of Managers, 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971) (limited
judicial review to "the narrow responsibility of assuring that the qualifications imposed by the Board are reasonably related to the operation of the hospital and fairly
administered"); Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59, 63 (D.D.C.
1963) ("extent of judicial review is to require compliance with the prescribed procedure"); Huffaker v. Bailey, 273 Or. 273, 540 P.2d 1398, 1401 (1975) (court limited
to determining whether the denial "was made in good faith and supported by an
adequate factual basis").
58. 277 Pa. 370, 419 A.2d 1191 (1980).
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his reappointment hearing59 by improperly commencing the proceedings
against him,6" by providing an inaccurate witness list, 6 ' and by filing

an unduly vague list of charges against him.62 In reviewing these alleged
bylaw violations, the court found that the error in the commencement of the proceedings was later corrected with no prejudice to the
plaintiff; the witness list was not so inaccurate as to preclude the
plaintiff from properly. preparing for the forthcoming proceedings;
and the list of charges was not only sufficient, but even summarized
evidence to be presented in support of each charge. The court held
that such "de minimis deviations" from the hospital bylaws were not
the type of violations that contravened the requirement of strict compliance with staff bylaws. 3 Since the staff bylaws of a hospital
constitute the terms of an enforceable agreement between the hospital
and the staff doctors, the hospital is held to a standard of strict compliance with those bylaws to the extent that the plaintiff-physician
is afforded his basic, rudimentary rights. Any violation which denies
a plaintiff-physician his fundamental rights will be seen as an impermissible breach. The Miller court concluded that the plaintiff-physician
was afforded his fundamental rights in that he received written notice,
an opportunity to prepare and be heard, a right to call witnesses and
to cross-examine adverse witnesses, a transcript of the hearings and
a right to appeal to the board of directors." The court seemed to
apply the "fairness standard" that was stated in Maimon.6 5
59. The plaintiff, Dr. Miller, was actually charged by the hospital with rendering unacceptable care to patients, and was therefore brought before the review committee to determine whether his staff privileges should be revoked. Miller v. Indiana
Hosp., 277 Pa. at 372, 419 A.2d at 1192-93.
60. Dr. Miller alleged that the hospital executive committee lacked "jurisdiction" to hear his case because proceedings were initiated against him upon receipt
of a complaint letter instead of a formal request for revocation. Id. at 373, 419
A.2d at 1193.
61. Id.
62. Dr. Miller claimed that the charges against him were not sufficiently precise.
Id.
63. Id. at 374, 419 A.2d at 1194.
64. Id. at 378, 419 A.2d at 1196.
65. See supra note 43 and accompanying text. A similar holding was reached
in the Louisiana case of Brickman v. Board of Directors, 372 So. 2d 701 (La. 1979).
In that case, the defendant hospital's bylaws required that any physician who was
denied staff membership had the right to a hearing within 10 days. The plaintiff,
Dr. Brickman, alleged that the hospital violated those bylaws by not granting him
a hearing until 15 days after he was denied staff membership. Upon review, the
court found "no showing of any significant deprivation of any of plaintiff's rights"
by commencing the hearing five days later. Id. at 705. Although there was admittedly
a direct violation of the hospital's bylaws in that the hearing was convened on January
18, 1978, instead of January 13, which would have been within the required time
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The same conclusion was reached in the Georgia case of Jackson
v. Fulton-DeKalb Hospital Authority." In considering the physician's
complaints as to the procedures followed in his hospital board
hearing, 67 the court noted that its review was limited to whether the
procedures followed by hospital officials comported with due process
and whether the decision was made arbitrarily or capriciously. 68 In
support of this ruling, the court stated that:
No court should substitute its evaluation of such matters for that
of the Hospital Board. It is the Board, not the court, which is
charged with the responsibility of providing a competent staff of
doctors. The Board has chosen to rely on the advice of its Medical
Staff, and the court cannot surrogate for the Staff in executing this
responsibility. Human lives are at stake, and the governing board
must be given discretion in its selection so that it can have confidence in the competence and moral commitment of its staff. The
evaluation of professional proficiency of doctors is best left to the
specialized expertise of their peers, subject only to limited judicial
surveillance. The court is charged with the narrow responsibility of
assuring that the qualifications imposed by the Board are reasonably
related to the operation of the hospital and fairly administered. In
short, so long as staff selections are administered with fairness, geared
by a rationale compatible with hospital responsibility, and unencumbered with irrelevant considerations, a court should not
6
interfere.

1

limit, the court found that "even had the proceeding begun five days earlier, the

numerous continuances requested by plaintiff to ascertain and review evidence to

be used in his hearing renders such a delay totally insignificant." Id. (emphasis added). Once again, the court limited itself to determining whether there was any significant deprivation of the plaintiff's rights due to the bylaw violation. Finding none,
the court affirmed the decision despite the violation.
66. 423 F. Supp. 1000 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
67. The plaintiff in this case, Dr. Jackson, contended that the bylaw procedure
used to revoke his hospital privileges violated his due process rights.
68. Jackson v. Fulton-DeKalb Hosp. Auth., 423 F. Supp. at 1003.
69. Id. (quoting Sosa v. Board of Managers, 437 F.2d 173, 177 (5th Cir. 1971)
(emphasis added)). This "fundamental right" limitation on judicial review was stressed
in Kaplan v. Carney, 404 F. Supp. 161 (E.D. Mo. 1975). In Kaplan, the plaintiff,
Dr. Kaplan, was reduced to associate status on the hospital staff pursuant to an
executive committee hearing. Subsequently, the plaintiff appealed, claiming that the
hospital failed to abide by its own bylaws in reducing his status. In considering the
plaintiff's claims, the court noted that its role in reviewing the actions of the hospital
was severly limited to "a consideration of 'whether his ultimate removal from the
staff involved deprivations of procedural or substantive rights guaranteed by the fourteenth amendment.' " Id. at 165. The court went on to add that where due process has
been sufficiently provided, the failure to follow internal procedures should not justify
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In Avol v. Hawthorne Community Hospital, Inc.," ° the plaintiff

contended that his summary suspension did not strictly comply with

the bylaws because the suspension decision was made by the board
of directors and the chief of staff instead of by the surgery department chairman as the bylaws required.' In considering the plaintiff's
claim, the court noted that the purpose of the bylaw requirementthat the appropriate departmental chairman acquiesce in the decision
to suspend a medical staff member-was to insure that this decision
not be made solely by hospital administrators lacking knowledge of
medicine, but by a physician as well. However, that purpose was
fulfilled by the presence of Dr. Dyer, the chief of staff.72 Consequently,

the court held that the bylaw violation was at "most a technical
irregularity which did not effectively prejudice Avol's rights.""

reversal of the board's decision. In concluding that the decision of the hospital should
stand, the court stated that to reverse a decision arrived at by a hospital and an
independent review board, upon compliance with due process, because internal hospital
procedures were not followed, and to order the plaintiff physician to be fully reinstated
as he requested, was not justified under the circumstances. The court stated, however,
that hospital procedures could not be "ignored with impunity." Id. In the case
presented, a reversal and reinstatement were simply unwarranted. The court held
that the plaintiff physician was afforded due process of law in that he was given
notice and an opportunity to be heard at three different stages of the proceedings.
After hearing all the evidence, the hospital and an independent review board found
that the plaintiff's status should be reduced, and the court simply concluded that
it could not "substitute its judgment for that of the experts involved in this decision." Id.
70. 135 Cal. App. 3d 101, 184 Cal. Rptr. 914 (1982).
71. Avol v. Hawthorne Community Hosp., 135 Cal. App. 3d 101, 184 Cal.
Rptr. 914, 919 (1982).
72. Id.
73. Id.One of the points brought up in the Avol court's opinion, that experts
in the field of medicine should be a part of the hospital review committee's decision
board, was noted in Shulman v. Washington Hosp. Center, 222 F. Supp. 59 (D.D.C.
1963). The Shulman court stated judicial review should be limited to determining
whether the physician was afforded his fundamental rights. The Shulman court stated
that there are sound reasons for judicial restraint in these matters. The judiciary
is simply not equipped to review the decisions of hospital authorities to refuse initial
staff appointments or decline to renew staff appointments. The authorities of a hospital
try to serve the sick and afflicted in the best possible manner, but not all doctors
are of equal competence, experience, reliability and character. The mere fact that
a doctor is licensed to practice medicine does hot justify any inference except that
he has satisfied minimum requirements and possesses minimum medical qualifications. A hospital endeavors to secure the most competent and experienced staff for
its patients, but in admitting a physician to its facilities, the hospital faces two burdens.
First, the hospital becomes legally liable for the actions of the physician and second,
it holds a physician out to the public as being competent. In addition, all doctors
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III.

RIGHT

To

COUNSEL

The minimal due process requirements imposed upon private
hospitals have also raised another issue for Illinois courts-whether
a physician has a right to counsel at each level of the application
review process. Since there are differing views as to the exact
requirements of minimal due process, jurisdictions have split on this
question. Some jurisdictions state that minimal due process requires
hospitals to afford physicians the right to be represented by counsel
at all stages of the application review process."' The opposing view
is that the private hospital application review process is not a formal
hearing, and therefore a physician would not be deprived of his
minimal due process rights if the hospital denied him the right to
be represented by counsel during the preliminary, informal stages of
the application review process.75 This section will discuss the decisions of Illinois courts, as well as those of other jurisdictions, as they
apply to this area. In addition, the Attorney General of Illinois has
recently written an opinion on this issue. His views on how the Illinois
Hospital Licensing Act impacts on the right to counsel, as well as
the influence of those views, will also be discussed.
A.

ILLINOIS

When listing the elements of a private hospital application hearing that satisfy due process, Illinois courts commonly include the physician's representation by counsel. For instance, in Ladenheim v. Union
6
County HospitalDistrict,"
the court concluded that the appellant was
assured due process in his administrative hearing when he received
notice, a hearing before an impartial tribunal, representation by
counsel, the opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, and the opportunity to inspect documentary evidence.7" It is apparent that the court
in Ladenheim did not specifically require the right to counsel, but
merely acknowledged it with various other elements in concluding that
due process had been satisfied. The informal nature of the hospital
may not be able to work in harmony with others, or inspire confidence in their
peers and patients. The Shulman court concluded by holding that "[in matters such
as these the courts are not in a position to substitute their judgment for that of
professional groups.".Id. at 64.

74. See infra note 88 and accompanying text.

75. See supra note 45 and accompanying text.
76. 76 III. App. 3d at 95, 394 N.E.2d at 774.
77. See Miller v. Indiana Hosp., 277 Pa. Super. 370, 419 A.2d 1191, 1196
(1980), where the court included "right to counsel" in its list of elements that led
to the conclusion that the physician's due process rights had been satisfied.
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application review process indicates that the right to counsel might
not be a mandatory requirement. 78 Decisionmakers in an informal
hospital application review process need not provide all the elements

7
of due process of law that are required in formal settings. "
8" the Illinois Supreme Court looked
In Greene v. Board of Trade,
to the informal atmosphere of administrative proceedings and concluded that "the exclusion of professional counsel does not violate
8
our sense of right, and is not against public policy or unreasonable." '
The court justified its holding by noting that bylaws of this type,
denying the right to counsel, do not infringe upon any public policy

or rule of law. As a result, the court elected to defer to associations
to enforce private rules and regulations and take disciplinary action

when warranted. 2
The issue in Parsons College v. North Central Association of

Colleges and Secondary Schools83 concerned similar due process con-

siderations. In that case the North Central Association of Colleges

and Secondary Schools took internal action to withdraw the accredita-

tion of the plaintiff college. 8" When faced with the issue of right to

counsel, the court cited Greene in holding that "there is no right to

counsel in hearings conducted by a private association." '85 In reaching

this decision, the court pointed out that the scope of due process
78. For example, the intention of one hospital as to the status of its review
process was shown in the ST. ANTHONY BYLAWS, infra Appendix A, at Rule 9.1 concerning interviews. "The interview shall not constitute a hearing, shall be preliminary
in nature, and need not be conducted according to the procedural rules provided
with respect to hearings."
79. See, e.g., Distaola v. Department of Registration and Educ., 72 Il. App.
3d 977, 391 N.E.2d 489 (1979). In Distaola, the court stated that due process in
administrative proceedings does not require the application of all rules and procedures
which govern criminal cases. Id. at 982, 391 N.E.2d at 493.
585, 51 N.E. 599 (1898).
80. 174 Ill.
at 593, 51 N.E. at 601.
81. Greene v. Board of Trade, 174 Ill.
82. Id. Although this decision was handed down in 1898, it is still cited and
followed by Illinois courts today. In Van Daele v. Vinci, 129 Il1. App. 2d 332, 264
N.E.2d 41 (1970), the plaintiff was expelled from a private grocery cooperative. The
court cited Greene in support of its holding that representation by counsel in a private
association hearing was not required by Illinois law. In listing the rights the plaintiff
was afforded, much like the court in Ladenheim did (see supra note 76 and accompanying text), the court took special care to cite Greene in pointing out that, although
the plaintiff in this case was afforded the right to counsel, representation by counsel
was not required by Illinois law. Van Daele, 129 IIl. App. 2d at 352, 264 N.E.2d at 51.
83. 271 F. Supp. 65 (N.D. Il1. 1967).
84. Parsons College v. North Cent. Ass'n of Colleges and Secondary Schools,
271 F. Supp. at 66.
85. Id.at 73.
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under the federal constitution is limited in that the constitutional
guarantees of the fifth and fourteenth amendments control only the
action of government for the purpose of guarding the individual against
the overwhelming power of the state. The due process guarantee does
not control the voluntary arrangements between private associations
and citizens because the Bill of Rights was adopted solely to protect
the citizen against oppression by the government, not to afford protection against one's own agreements."6 For this reason, the term due
process is something of a misnomer when used in reference to the
termination of an individual's membership in a private association,
organized to maintain the standards in a profession, because no federal
8 7
question is present.
B.

OTHER JURISDICTIONS

In other jurisdictions where the application decisions of private
hospitals are not subject to judicial review, 88 courts have generally
held that there is no right to counsel in hearings conducted by a private
association. As with Illinois courts, these jurisdictions hold that in
the informal setting of a private hospital hearing, the requirements
of due process are less restrictive than in a formal trial setting.
The California Supreme Court addressed this point in Anton v.
San Antonio Community Hospital.9 Due to his failure to complete
hospital medical records, the plaintiff, Dr. Anton, was brought before
the executive and credentials committees of the hospital and summarily
suspended from the medical staff.9" In appealing his decision, one
of the plaintiff's arguments was that he was denied due process of
law because he was denied representation by counsel. The committee's refusal to permit representation was based on a hospital bylaw
granting the review committee discretion to determine whether a
physician may be represented by legal counsel. 9' The court rejected
86. Id. at 70 (citing Rosee v. Board of Trade, 311 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1963)
and North Dakota v. North Cent. Ass'n., 23 F. Supp. 694, 700 (E.D. I11.), aff'd,
99 F.2d 697 (7th Cir. 1938)).
87. Parsons College, 271 F. Supp. at 70.
88. See supra notes 44 & 45. Cases such as Garrow v. Elizabeth Gen. Hosp.,
79 N.J. 549, 401 A.2d 533 (1979), follow the minority view that hospitals have a
public fiduciary duty and as such are subject to judicial review. These cases also
differ with Illinois decisions on the issue of right to counsel, holding that a physician does have such a right.
89. 19 Cal. 3d 802, 567 P.2d 1162, 140 Cal. Rptr. 442 (1977).
90. Anton v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d at 809, 567 P.2d
at 1164, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 444.
91. The bylaws required that a plaintiff make a timely request for representa-
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the plaintiff's contention, holding that leaving the question of legal
representation within the discretion of the judicial review committee
was not "offensive to the standard of 'minimal due process' which
is applicable in proceedings of this kind." 9 2 In reaching this decision,
the California court looked to the purpose and motive of the bylaw
in question. The bylaw provided that neither the person requesting
the hearing, the executive committee, nor the board of trustees were
permitted legal representation during any phase of the hearing procedure unless the judicial review committee allowed both sides to be
represented by legal counsel. The reason for the court's hesitancy to
allow representation by counsel was due to the sensitive nature of
the hearings. The court stated the purpose of a hearing was to provide interprofessional resolution of matters bearing on professional
competency. 3 The fact that, in lieu of such permitted legal counsel,
the affected physician could be represented by another physician9 4 was
evidence of the hospital's desire to keep the hearings free from legal
technicalities.
In Gilbert v. Johnson,9 5 the plaintiff, Dr. Gilbert appealed a
discharge from his position as associate chief of staff at Veterans
Administration Hospital. In considering his appeal, the court noted
that the hospital was not required to afford the doctor the same procedural safeguards at an informal hearing before the disciplinary board
as those one is entitled to in a trial-type adversary hearing. 6 The
reasoning for this was based on the presumption that the standards
of procedural due process are not absolute, but are determined on
the basis of the parties, subject matter, and the circumstances
involved." For example, in criminal cases, the exhaustive scope of
due process rights have long been assured by courts. However, in
the context of administrative hearings, the full scope of procedural
due process is not applicable. Consequently, the Gilbert court, 98 as
tion by an attorney, as the board had to determine whether both sides should be

represented by legal counsel or neither side. In the present case, the plaintiff failed
to make a timely request, and was therefore denied representation. Id. at 827, 567
P.2d at 1176-77, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 456.
92. Id., 567 P.2d at. 177, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 457.
93. Id., 567 P.2d at 1176, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 456.

94. Id.

95. 419 F. Supp. 859 (N.D. Ga. 1976).
96. Gilbert, 419 F. Supp. at 861.
97. Id. at 878 (quoting Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970)).

98. The minimal requisites of due process in an administrative hearing were
set out in two cases cited by the Gilbert court. In Charles v. Blount, 430. F.2d 665,
666 (7th Cir. 1970), the minimal requisites were stated as the right to a fair and
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well as other courts, 99 have concluded that nowhere in the requirements
of due process is there stated a constitutional obligation that the ac-

cused in an administrative hearing have a right to representation by

legal counsel.
°°
Conversely, courts not following the majority rule of nonreview
have held that physicians are entitled to be represented by counsel
during these informal private hospital hearings. A principal case supporting this view is Garrow v. Elizabeth General Hospital.' In that
case, the plaintiff, a New Jersey physician, sought admission to the
staff of the defendant Elizabeth General Hospital as a pediatric

surgeon. At first his application received favorable approval from
various review committees. However, before final action was taken

on his application, the hospital received additional information conopen hearing on articulated charges with the right of confrontation and crossexamination. In Ferguson v. Thomas, 430 F.2d 852, 856 (5th Cir. 1970), the minimal
due process requirements for an administrative hearing were stated as sufficient notice
of the charges, procurement of the names and nature of testimony of adversary
witnesses, an opportunity to be heard and the right to a hearing before an impartial
tribunal.
99. In Silver v. Castle Memorial Hosp., 53 Hawaii 475, 497 P.2d 564, cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 1048 (1972), the plaintiff-physician had his staff privileges taken
away and he appealed, claiming denial of due process of law. In considering the
plaintiff's claims, the court noted that such a hearing was not required to contain all the aspects of a formal judicial hearing and held that the physician's due
process rights would not be denied as long as the physician received notice, a written
statement of the charges against him, the opportunity to defend himself, and the
right to call his own witnesses. Id. at 484-85, 497 P.2d at 571. The court added that it
should be within the discretion of the hospital board as to whether a physician may
be represented by counsel. In deciding this question, the court looked to the interests
of the parties concerned.
The doctor has an interest in being able to pursue his profession which
requires that the necessary facilities be made available to him. The hospital
is interested in preserving its autonomy and in maintaining quality control
in its medical staff. The public's interest lies in the perpetuation of that
quality control and, in the sense that its services are and remain available
to those in need, in the productivity of the hospital.
Id. If the hospitals were burdened with the responsibility of complying with technical
procedures when reviewing applicants for their medical staff, the interests of everyone
would be defeated. Id. Although a hearing with all the aspects of a formal judicial
proceeding is not necessary, the doctor applying for staff status or subject to review
is entitled to a hearing containing the basic elements of due process of law as set
out above. As this court pointed out, the right to representation by legal counsel
is not one of those basic rights. However, the court also noted that such a limitation
would not preclude a doctor from consulting with an attorney prior to the hearing
even though the attorney would not be allowed to participate in the actual hearing.
Id. at 485, 497 P.2d at 572.
100. See supra note 88.

101. 155 N.J. Super. 78, 382 A.2d 393 (1977).
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cerning the plaintiff, and his petition was subsequently denied., 2 After
the physician had filed for an order to show cause for denial, the
additional issue of right to counsel was added to the controversy.' 3
In considering this issue, the court decided to depart from its holding
in Sussman v. Overlook Hospital,'4 wherein the court stated it was
not essential that physicians be afforded the right to counsel.' 5 Instead, the Garrow court held that physicians should have the right
to be represented by counsel. The court stated that a physician's due
process rights are derived from the public trust and fiduciary obligation imposed on a private hospital as well as the state action implicated by the assistance the hospitals receive from public funding
under the Hill-Burton Act. Inherent in those due process rights is
the right to counsel. In addition, the court noted that the right to
counsel at these hearings was compelled by the physician's interest
in hospital admission. To leave a physician without counsel at a factfinding hearing where an adverse decision affects the physician's ability
to practice his profession mandates the right to be represented by
counsel.'"" In concluding that the contrary holding in Sussman was
overruled, the court cited several cases supporting its findings.'0 7
C.

ATTORNEY GENERAL OPINION

In light of the case law of these other jurisdictions, as well as
that of Illinois, the Illinois Attorney General, Neil F. Hartigan, recently
wrote an opinion concerning a physician's right to legal counsel,
entitled: Public Health: Due Process Rights of Podiatrists Who App08
ly for Hospital Medical Staff Membership.'

102. Garrow v.Elizabeth Gen. Hosp., 155 N.J. Super. 78, 382 A.2d 393, 396
(1977).
103. Garrow, 155 N.J. Super. at 85, 382 A.2d at 396.
104. 95 N.J. Super. 418, 231 A.2d 389 (1967).
105. The Sussman court focused on the lack of experience that hospital review
boards have incontrast to administrative agencies. The court felt that hospital review
boards simply do not have the knowledge, time or money to act as a quasi-judicial
body. In conclusion, the court felt that hospital hearings were adequate enough to
protect the physician's interests. Garrow, 155 N.J. Super. at 86, 382 A.2d at 397.
106. Id. at 90, 382 A.2d at 398-99.
107. The Garrow court stated:
We are also satisfied that we will not be imposing an undue practical
burden on the hospital by permitting the physician to be represented by
counsel should he so desire. As a simple empirical proposition we note first
that many hospitals apparently routinely do permit representation by counsel
at hearings involving both admission and termination decisions.
Id. at 91, 382 A.2d at 399 (citations omitted).
108. Public Health, supra note 20.

[1985:2411

PRIVATE HOSPITAL REVIEW

1. Facts
The Attorney General's opinion was issued pursuant to the request
of Fred H. Uhlig, acting director of the Illinois Department of Public
Health.' 0 9 The purpose of the request, and the basis for this opinion,
was to determine what procedures must be afforded by a licensed
hospital to a podiatrist"' seeking admission to its medical staff in
order to satisfy the due process guarantee incorporated in Rule 3-1.1
of the Illinois Hospital Licensing Requirements."' The area of uncertainty necessitating this opinion was created by Rule 3-1.1,112 which
mandates that any applicant for staff membership must be afforded
procedural due process and a fair hearing on his application."' The
question was what procedures are required by the term ''due process"
in Rule 3-1.1.
The findings of this opinion were applicable not only to
podiatrists, but to physicians generally. Although the opinion requested
the procedures for a podiatrist, Rule 3.1-1 applies to all applicants
for medical staff membership,' 4 including physicians. In addition,
this opinion covered private as well as public hospitals, as the Hospital
Licensing Act and Hospital Licensing Requirements apply to both
public and private hospitals."I 5
109. Actually, Mr. Uhlig's predecessor had requested the opinion, but it was
given to Mr. Uhlig.
110. "Podiatrist" is defined in ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111, § 4908 (1983), as a
"physician licensed to practice podiatric medicine, which involves the diagnosis and
medical, physical or surgical treatment of the ailments of the human foot, with the
exception that administration of general anesthetics or amputation of the foot shall
not be included."
Ill. Public Health, supra note 20, at 1.
112. The pertinent part of rule 3-1.1 reads:
The medical staff shall be organized in accordance with written bylaws, rules
and regulations, approved by the Governing Board. The bylaws, rules and
regulations shall specifically provide but not be limited to the following
provisions:
(a) for written procedures for accepting and processing applications for
medical staff membership which shall include verification of current license
in Illinois and biennial review of renewed license.
(b) for eligibility for staff membership, whether the practitioners are or are
not currently members of the medical staff;
(c) for a policy that specifies a procedure for processing applications for
staff privileges and guarantees due process and fair hearing for each such
applicant: Id. at 3 (emphasis original).
113. Id.
114. See supra note 112.
115. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 111 1/2 § 144 (1983).
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2.

Analysis

Despite the weight of Illinois case law imposing limits on the
scope of due process in an administrative setting plus case law from
other jurisdictions following the same rule '6 as Illinois, the Illinois
Attorney General's Opinion of April 4, 1984117 paralleled the holding
in Garrow that physicians have the right to counsel in informal private
hospital application review hearings. The Attorney General's Opinion
is of significant concern due to the possible weight and deference it
may carry. Although an Attorney General's Opinion is not binding
upon the courts, it often carries considerable weight and
persuasiveness" 8 and is generally followed by the officers who receive
the opinion." 9 In many instances, the opinion will be followed by
officials even though it requires disregarding specific statutory
provisions. 120
The Attorney General Opinion indicated that a licensed hospital
must afford each applicant for medical staff membership the opportunity to be represented by counsel at each level of the application
review process.' 2 ' This conclusion was supported through statutory
interpretation. First, Attorney General Hartigan set out the language
of Rule 3-1.1 of the Illinois Hospital Licensing Requirements,' 2 2 which
states that a medical staff shall provide for a "policy that specifies
a procedure for processing applications for staff privileges and
guarantees due process and a fair hearing for each such applicant."' 2 3
Noting that the rule specifically provides for due process, the Attorney
General then employed a rule of construction and stated that where
a statute uses a phrase having an established legal connotation, it is
116. See supra note 45.

117. Public Health, supra note 20.
118. Scott, The Role of Attorney General's Opinions in Illinois, 67 Nw. U.L.

REv. 643, 649 (1973).

119. Id. at 653.
120. Id. at 649-50.
121. The full sentence states:
For reasons hereinafter stated, it is my opinion that, pursuant to Rule 3-1.1
of the Illinois Hospital Licensing Requirements, the pertinent rules, regulations and bylaws of a licensed hospital must afford each applicant for medical
staff membership, including podiatrists: reasonable notice; the opportunity
to appear and be heard, in person and by counsel, at each level of the
application review process; the opportunity to present evidence and examine
evidence tendered against him; and the opportunity to present, confront
and cross-examine witnesses.
Public Health, supra note 20, at 2.
122. See supra note 112.
123. Public Health, supra note 20, at 3.
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assumed that such phrase is intended to have that connotation., 2 4 The

Attorney General then added that the legal significance of the phrase
due process is that it requires a fundamental fairness, such fairness
being assured by providing notice of and an opportunity to be heard
at a hearing. 2' 5 Hartigan cited Ladenheim v. Union County Hospital
District'26 and Poe v. CharlotteMemorial Hospital'27 as case law which

has delineated the elements of procedural due process in a hospital

application process. From these rules and cases, the Attorney General
concluded that rule 3-1.128 requires that the bylaws of a licensed
hospital afford every applicant the right to counsel. 29
The reasoning of this Attorney General's opinion is questionable,
however, in light of the previously discussed Illinois case law. Although
the Attorney General tried to infer that the phrase "due process"
guaranteed the full scope of rights afforded in a formal trial
proceeding, 30 the cases previously discussed apparently take the
opposite view. As the court in Parsons College '"' pointed out, the
restrictions on the scope of the federal constitution and the Bill of
Rights permit relaxed procedural due process in informal hearings.' 3 2
The Attorney General's reliance on Ladenheim and Poe as support
for his conclusion that the right to representation by counsel is a required element of due process appears misplaced. In Ladenheim, the
court merely acknowledged that the physician was represented by
124. Id. at 4 (citing People ex reL Mayfield v. City of Springfield, 16 I11.2d
609, 615 (1959) and Hetzer v. State Police Merit Bd., 49 Ill. App. 3d 1045, 1047
(1977)).125. Public Health, supra note 20, at 5 (citing Lassiter v. Department of Social
Servs., 452 U.S. 18, 24 (1981); Mullane v. Central Hanover Trust, 339 U.S. 306,
314-15 (1950); Barnett v. County of Cook, 388 I11.251, 255 (1944); Griffin v. County
of Cook, 369 I11. 380, 386 (1938)).
126. 76 I11. App. 3d 90, 394 N.E.2d 770 (1979).
127. 374 F. Supp. 1302 (W.D.N.C. 1974).
128. See supra note 112.
129. Public Health, supra note 20, at 8-9.
130. See supra note 125 and accompanying text.
131. See supra note 83 and accompanying text.
132. See supra note 86. Accord Gilbert v. Johnson, 419 F. Supp. 859, 877-78
(N.D. Ga. 1976). Therein the court held that a hospital review board was not required to afford a physician the full compliment of rights that he would be entitled
to in a trial-type adversary hearing. The court reasoned that the standards of procedural due process are determined by the circumstances, and that informal hearings
(such as a hospital review hearing) demand only minimal due process. See also Anton
v. San Antonio Community Hosp., 19 Cal. 3d 802, 827, 567 P.2d 1162, 1177, 140
Cal. Rptr. 442, 457 (1977), where the court held that leaving the question of legal
representation up to the discretion of the judicial review committee was not offensive to the standard of minimal due process.
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counsel during the hearing; the court never stated that representation
by counsel was a specific requirement of due process in informal hearings. In fact, the Ladenheim court held that in informal proceedings,
such as the hospital application process, it was unnecessary to extend
all the procedural safeguards of due process of law that are required
in more formal settings.' 33 The Poe case is even less supportive. Poe
did not even mention the right to counsel in stating that a necessary
is the opportunity to defend at a time when
element of due process
34
effective.'
be
can
it
Despite the Attorney General's opinion, it would appear that
Illinois courts view the hospital application review process as an informal hearing that is not subject to the full scope of procedural
safeguards. In light of the burdens that would be imposed upon
hospitals if they were required to conform to the stricter requirements
of a more formal hearing, such as providing the right to counsel,
these decisions seem to be sound.
IV.

IMPLICATIONS

If Illinois courts were to adopt the minority view' 35 and permit
the staffing decisions of hospital review boards to be subject to judicial
review, the resulting burden on the hospitals in selecting their medical
staffs could subsequently affect the quality of medical care provided.
As of yet, no Illinois court has defined the authority extended to
a court by the phrase "limited judicial review." However, an analysis
of Illinois and foreign jurisdiction decisions indicates that the scope
of review in cases where a hospital violates its own bylaws in expellof whether the physician
ing a physician is limited to a determination
36
was afforded his rudimentary rights.'
The above view is consistent with an interpretation of hospital
bylaws as being primarily a contract between an association and
members of its staff.'" Pursuant to this contract perspective, a hospital
or association is allowed to expel members for infringements of rules
and regulations and courts should not interfere so long as the bylaws
are reasonable and not against public policy.
Moreover, it is nearly impossible to articulate precise standards

133. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
134. Public Health, supra note 20 (quoting Poe v. Charlotte Memorial Hosp.,
Inc., 374 F. Supp. 1302, 1310-11 (W.D.N.C. 1974)).
135. See supra note 44 and accompanying text.
136. See supra notes 28-41 and accompanying text.
137. See supra note 33. See also supra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
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in the area of personal fitness.' 38 Implicitly, this places a tremendous
burden upon hospital administrators when they attempt to assemble
a medical staff that is both competent and able to work well together.
Recognizing this difficulty, considerable deference should be afforded
the decisions of a hospital board in selecting its medical staff. There
are several other reasons for restricting the scope of judicial review
in this area. First, it is the hospital board and not the court which
has the responsibility of providing a competent medical staff. The
decisionmaking process has a direct impact upon the quality of care
a hospital can deliver. A hospital board should be given broad discretion in selecting its medical staff to assure the competence and moral
commitment of members thereof. Furthermore, the evaluation of professional proficiency in this area is best left to medical physicians who
serve as both experts and peers.139
As a final consideration, it is important to note that the staffing
decisions of hospital boards are based on criteria unfamiliar to courts.
The fact that a physician is licensed does not necessarily qualify him
to practice at a certain hospital. Other factors must be considered
such as competency and ability to work and cooperate with other
staff members.'" These factors relate to ultimate consequences of the
staffing decisions each hospital board must make, for once a physician is appointed to its medical staff, the hospital becomes legally
liable for the actions of the physician and extends a moral imprimatur
to the physician in the eyes of the public. 4 ' For these reasons courts
should be very reluctant to interfere in the decisions of a hospital
board, and should only do so when those decisions deeply deprive
a physician of his fundamental rights.
In addition to the potentially harmful implications of subjecting
the application decisions of hospitals to judicial review, a similar result
could occur if physicians were allowed to be represented by counsel
at all levels of the application review process. If Illinois courts were
to follow the opinion of the Attorney General,' 4 2 the subsequent burden
that would be place upon hospitals to comply with such requirements
could have a negative impact on the quality of medical care provided.
As a private association administering its internal procedures, a hospital
has the right to prescribe its own rules." ' There are at least two reasons
138.
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

See supra note 40.
See supra notes 66-69 and accompanying text.
See supra note 73.
Id.
See supra note 117.
It has been stated that "[a] governing board to which is committed the
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why a hospital would include a provision in those rules that denies
physicians the right to be represented by legal counsel. First, the need
to insure that the hospital's peer review process will not be undermined and second, the need to keep the application review process,
which consists almost entirely of persons with medical backgrounds,
free from the legal technicalities of a formal hearing.'"
The peer review process is an essential element in the hospital's
efforts to maintain high standards of professional care. The overall
responsibility for the quality of medical care in hospitals rests with
the medical staff. The medical staff must perform supervisory functions such as regular review, monitoring, and evaluation of medical
staff practice and functions in order to fulfill that responsibility. In
addition, physicians are often required to investigate the credentials
of applicants for staff privileges, thus becoming part of the application review process.'" 5 There are conflicting interests involved in this
the presence of
peer review process, however, which militate4 against
6
Wu:'
v.
Jenkins
in
stated
As
legal counsel.
Doctors are motivated to engage in strict peer review by the desire
to maintain the patient's well-being and to establish a highly respected
name for both the hospital and the practitioner within the public
and professional communities. However, doctors seem to be reluctant to engage in strict peer review due to a number of apprehensions: loss of referrals, respect, and friends, possible retaliations,
vulnerability to torts, and fear of malpractice actions in which the
records of the peer review proceedings might be used.'" 7
As the supreme court indicated, there is a delicate balance which must
be upheld in order for the hospitals to maintain this vital process.
Legislative recognition of the sensitivity inherent in this situation is
evidenced by the Medical Studies Act.'" 8 This act was passed to assure
physicians confidentiality when it was feared that absent such
assurances, physicians would be reluctant to sit on peer review committees and engage in frank evaluations of their colleagues.'" Similarly,
management and control of a private hospital has the power to adopt any regulation
that is reasonable and consistent with its general purposes." Fahey v. Holy Family
Hosp., 32 Ill. App. 3d 537, 544, 336 N.E.2d 309, 314 (1975).
144. See supra note 69 and accompanying text.
145. Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for
Hospitals, 106 (1982).
146. 102 I11.2d 468, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984).
147. Jenkins v. Wu, 102 111.2d at 480, 468 N.E.2d at 1168 (quoting Note, Medical
Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP. L.Q. 552, 558 (1979)).
148. See ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, § 8-2101 (1983).
149. Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at 480, 468 N.E.2d at 1168.
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the presence of an attorney at any of the application review steps
could have the same chilling effect. Physicians would presumably be

hesitant to constructively criticize their colleagues for fear of a tort

action against themselves, or a malpractice suit against the petitioning physician. 5 ' Since the overall quality of medical care rests with

the medical staff and its participation in the peer review process,"'

any actions which might undermine that process would most certainly
have an adverse effect on the quality of medical care provided by
hospitals.
A second problem in granting the right to counsel at all levels
of the review process involves the desire to keep legal technicalities
out of the application review process. As the court in Greene v. Board
of Trade'52 pointed out, the board of directors in these situations are
composed of persons not conversant with forms of procedure and
technicalities of law." 3 They are organized into committees designed
to review medical staff applicants in accord with the hospital's bylaws,
not to interpret and apply technical rules of law. Therefore, the
presence of legal counsel, rather than advancing the interest of the
accused, could impede the procedure by introducing technicalities of
5
law unfamiliar to the committee members.'
V.

CONCLUSION

Due to the technical criteria involved in making hospital medical
staff application decisions, courts should limit their review of these
decisions. Hospital boards must inquire beyond whether the physician is licensed to practice medicine. These boards also must examine
competency, moral commitment, ability to work with other staff
members, and other factors in determing whether to admit the physician to their staff. Much of the reason that hospitals are so concerned
with the selection of their staff is due to the legal liability they encounter when admitting a physician to the medical staff, as well as
the message of confidence in that physician that is sent out to the
public. As a result of these factors and decisions, it appears that the
rule, as established by Illinois case law with regard to this issue, is
that where a hospital violates its bylaws in expelling or rejecting a
physician from membership on its medical staff, the courts will be

150. Id.

151. See supra note'145 and accompanying text.

152. 174 Il1. 585, 51 N.E. 599 (1898).

153. Greene, 74 111. at 593, 51 N.E. at 601.
154. Id.
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limited in review to a determination of whether the physician was
afforded his fundamental rights in the application review process.
Because private hospital review board hearings are also informal
in nature, it is not offensive to the standards of minimal due process
to leave the question of legal representation up to the discretion of
the hospital board. Courts are apparently aware of the importance
of keeping these hearings free from legal technicalities, as the purpose
of the hearings is to resolve professional matters internally. The lack
of legal involvement is also important to hospital boards in maintaining a peer review process which is essential to maintenance of
high standards of professional care. The combination of these needs
and the case law of Illinois indicate that physicians do not have the
right to be represented by counsel at each level of the application
review process.
PATRICK

H.

AGNEW
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Appendix
6.2.1 Application Form. Each application for appointment to STAFF
STATUS shall be in writing, submitted on the prescribed form and signed by the
applicant.
6.4.2 Verification of Information. The applicant shall deliver a completed
application to the CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER, who shall ... transmit the application and all related materials to the chairman of each department in which the
applicant seeks PRIVILEGES and to the credentials committee.
6.4.3 Department Action. Upon receipt, the chairman of each such department shall review the application ... and transmit to the credentials committee a
written report and recommendation as to STAFF STATUS ....
6.4.4 Credentials Committee Action. The credentials committee shall review
the application, the related documentation compiled, each department chairman's
report and recommendations, and ... shall then transmit to the MEDICAL STAFF
a written report and recommendations as to STAFF STATUS ....
6.4.5 Medical Staff Action. At its next regular meeting ... the MEDICAL
STAFF shall consider the report, the application, the related documentation compiled
and other relevant information available to it. The MEDICAL STAFF shall then
forward to the CHIEF EXECUTIVE OFFICER for transmittal to the BOARD the
application ... and a written report and recommendation as to STAFF STATUS ....
6.4.9 Notice of Final Decision. Notice of the BOARD'S final decision shall be
given to the president of the MEDICAL STAFF, to the chairman of the credentials
committee, to the chairman of each department concerned and to the applicant by
means of SPECIAL NOTICE.
9.1 Interviews. When the credentials committee or the BOARD receives or is
considering initiating an adverse recommendation or action concerning a PRACTITIONER, the PRACTITIONER may, in the discretion of the credentials committee
or the BOARD, be afforded an interview. The interview shall not constitute a hearing, shall be preliminary in nature, and need not be conducted according to the
procedural rules provided with respect to hearings. The PRACTITIONER shall be
informed of the general nature of the circumstances and may present information
and documents relevant thereto. A concise record of such interview shall be made.
At said interview, the PRACTITIONER shall not be entitled to representation by
an attorney or any other person.
9.2 Adverse Recommendations or Actions. A PRACTITIONER shall be
entitled to a hearing pursuant to the provisions of these bylaws only after an adverse
recommendation or adverse action ....
9.5 Hearing Procedure Following an Adverse Action. The hearing procedure
following an adverse action of the BOARD shall consist of a hearing before a hearing committee ... and appellate review of an adverse recommendation by the hearing
committee as such appellate review is provided for herein.
9.27 Request for Appellate Review. A PRACTITIONER shall have ten days
following his receipt of a SPECIAL NOTICE ... to file a written request for an
appellate review ....

